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Constructions of the self in 
interaction with the Beck 
Depression Inventory
Dariusz Galasin´ski
University of Wolverhampton, UK
a b s t r a c t  In this article, I am interested in discourses of people com-
pleting the Polish version of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). I focus 
upon the negotiation of the spaces for constructing the self opened by the 
BDI. My corpus consists of transcripts of 50 sessions in which self-reportedly 
healthy people were asked to ‘think aloud’ while completing the BDI. I shall 
demonstrate that in interactions with the ‘depression scale’, the informants 
mostly rejected the spaces offered by it. Three strategies of such rejection 
are discussed: reformulation, recontextualization and an explicit challenge to 
the categories offered by the BDI. I shall argue that the concerns of lived 
experience in a particular context, when not subdued by the relationship of 
power in the situation of medical examination, overrule the frame imposed 
by the a-contextual questionnaire of sadness. Insight into depression or its 
intensity offered by ‘context-free’ psychological or psychiatric instrument, 
set outside lived experience, is extremely problematic.
k e y w o r d s  BDI; depression; discourse; experience; psychiatric tests; 
psychiatry
a d d r e s s  Dariusz Galasin´ski, Humanities, Languages, and Social Sciences, 
University of Wolverhampton, Wulfruna Street, Wolverhampton WV1 1SB, UK. 
[Tel: +44 1902 323408; fax: +44 1902 322739; e-mail: d.galasinski@wlv.ac.uk]
The Beck Depression Inventory
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), now in its second version, is a self-
assessment tool for gauging the severity of depression (Beck et al., 1961; and 
for the second version, Beck et al., 1996). It is one of the most widely used 
and reputed to be reliable and valid self-report measures of depression, for 
patients in psychiatric care as well as the rest of the population (Nezu et al., 
2002). The second version of the scale, the BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) was 
designed to refl ect the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria of the major depressive 
episode. Intended not to refl ect any theoretical stance of aetiology of 
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depression (Beck and Beamesderfer, 1974), it consists of 21 items, each to 
be answered by questions ranked from 0 to 3, representing severity levels 
from no symptom to the most severe. 
The psychiatric literature on the BDI focuses mostly upon its psycho-
metric features, quoting the level of its reliability and validity (e.g. Beck 
et al., 1988; Schotte et al., 1997) and commonly applauds them (see e.g. Nezu 
et al., 2002). Criticisms are relatively infrequent and focus mostly on what 
exactly the Inventory measures. Coyne (1994) suggests for example that the 
BDI might measure the level of general psychological distress rather than 
severity of depression and points out that the scores of BDI can be reduced 
drastically a few days after admission to hospital, despite the fact that the 
patient might not have received any signifi cant treatment (van Praag and 
Plutchik, 1987; Katz et al., 1995). Endler and his associates (2000) point 
out that the BDI might measure trait-like depression and, signifi cantly, dif-
ferent aspects and levels of depression in clinical and non-clinical samples. 
In addition, Richter and his associates (1998) also indicate, among others, 
high item diffi culties or doubtful objectivity of interpretation. Finally, there 
are also reports that the BDI might be interacted with differently, depending 
on gender and age of those who complete it (e.g. Page and Bennesch, 1993; 
Wallace and Pfohl, 1995; Aben et al., 2002; see also Steer et al., 1999).
However, such criticisms are made predominantly within the parameters 
set by the discourses of quantitatively oriented psychiatry and clinical psy-
chology, taking an explicitly positivist research perspective. It assumes that 
questionnaires can gauge a ‘psychological reality’ of or in the people who com-
plete them. They are looked at only as instruments that are to provide re-
searchers with data of ‘good quality’ and thus must be clear, accurate, complete, 
logical and must compute well (Gillham, 2000; also Conrad et al., 1999).
Interestingly, even though there is some literature interrogating psycho-
logical and psychiatric instruments qualitatively (e.g. Morse et al., 1998; 
Gilgun, 2004), there is very little literature looking at them as socially situ-
ated texts (e.g. Drennan et al., 1991). However, I have found practically 
no literature approaching such instruments as institutionally empowered 
texts with which those who complete them enter into interaction and thus 
as texts which open up interaction spaces within which the person must 
fi nd her/himself within (Koze˜owska, 2004). A notable exception is a recent 
study by Barroso and Sandelowski (2001) in which the authors interrogate 
the BDI in view of the interactions one of them had while administrating 
the questionnaire. They point out not only the diffi culty their informants 
had with the BDI, but also the fact that their experience of depression could 
not be squared to fi t into the scale. A disadvantage of this signifi cant study 
is lack of a systematic insight into the discourses of those challenging the 
BDI, and focusing on the shortcomings of the instrument. In this article, I 
am going to reverse the perspective and focus upon those who were com-
pleting the scale.
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Aims
I am interested here in how people asked to complete the BDI enter into 
interaction with it, how they negotiate the questionnaire and, more par-
ticularly, how they discursively negotiate the spaces the text afforded the 
respondent for constructing her/himself and her/his experience. Exploring 
the ways in which the self is constructed in interaction with the BDI, I am 
also interested in the implicit power relations within the interaction and 
what they mean for lived experience of mental illness (that is what people 
make of their illness).
The study
The research this article is based upon is part of a larger study into re-
spondents’ experiences of depression scales, and in this article I am focusing 
upon interactions with the Beck Depression Inventory. A convenience 
sample of 52 self-reportedly healthy men and women, and with no incidence 
of psychiatric care, were asked to complete the BDI and ‘think aloud’ 
while doing it.1 The sessions were carried out by 2nd-year students of 
the Warsaw School of Social Psychology studying for an MA in psychology, 
who also were those to approach the informants with a request for an inter-
view. The decision to ask students to contact the informants and administer 
the questionnaire resulted from my wish to create as non-face-threatening 
a research context as possible, and thus one conducive to engaging with the 
instrument. The young researchers were unlikely to have been perceived 
as in a position of signifi cant power over the informants. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. I hope it will be clear in the course of this 
article that the informants’ choices were psychopathologically meaningless; 
their ‘scores’ were therefore ignored.
The informants were chosen on the basis of their age (young and elderly), 
education (with primary/vocational and at least an MA in a discipline 
of the social sciences) and domicile (living in villages/small towns and in 
large cities). There were four groups of informants: (1) young, educated 
living in cities; (2) elderly, uneducated living in small towns or villages; 
(3) elderly, educated living in cities; (4) young, uneducated living in small 
towns or villages. They were told that they were participating in a study 
on how people fi ll out questionnaires such as the one they were about to 
complete and they were asked to ‘think aloud’ while doing it. During the 
session, those administering the BDI were instructed not to engage in any 
interaction with the informants. Thus, even in cases of being directly ad-
dressed by the informants with any issues concerning the research, the re-
searchers were instructed not to answer them and limit their responses to 
the information from the beginning of the session.
By asking the informants to ‘think aloud’, I refer to the fact that people 
occasionally speak to themselves, and/or to other people, while doing 
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something. It is a social and discursive practice consisting in commenting 
upon or explaining one’s actions as those actions are being done. Although 
it does not have to, the practice may involve interacting with those ob-
serving the activity. I decided to keep the term, rather than change it to 
something more ‘scientifi c’ such as ‘on-line commentary’ or the like, not 
only to refl ect that I tried to anchor the research within an existing social 
practice, making my research more ‘ecological’, but also to make it more 
intelligible for my informants. For them what they were asked to do was 
‘thinking aloud’. Needless to say, using the term I do not wish to claim 
that in the process we tapped into the informants’ underlying thoughts.
This is in sharp contrast to pre-testing techniques in psychological 
research and as a cognitive interview technique. On-line commentary is 
used to test the contents and the design of questionnaires. Informants are 
asked to report on their understanding of questions and options given and 
emotions towards them, or to comment on potential omissions (e.g. Blair 
and Presser, 1993; Gray et al., 2005). Such sessions are also claimed to pro-
vide insight into the informants’ underlying thinking (e.g. Ericsson and 
Simon, 1993; Conrad et al., 1999). I wish to make no such claims.
The request to ‘think aloud’ while completing the BDI was the only 
instruction given to the informants. I thus attempted to get the respon-
dents to take on the identity of informants trying to negotiate their 
‘interests’, their ‘real’ answers, with the choices they were offered by the 
instrument. It is important to note that the technique, which was used in a 
qualitative ‘replication’ of a questionnaire (Koze˜owska, 2004), resulted 
from a spontaneous commentary during completing of a questionnaire 
by informants, rather than from an instruction. My research attempts to 
capitalize on what Koze˜owska observed as a social need to comment and 
account for questionnaire choices. 
In the research I used the Polish version of the Beck Depression 
Inventory (e.g. Bilikiewicz et al., 2002: 511–13; also available as a hospital 
resource, published as promotional material for Lerivon, an anti-depressant 
medication), which is based upon the fi rst edition of the BDI. The Inventory 
consists of 21 items, all with 4 options, numbered from 0 to 3, with 0 con-
sistently indicating no depressive symptoms (yet, nil score on the scale still 
indicates depression, see later) and 3 the most severe ones (but see the 
critique of the language of the scale suggesting that in fact it is not a scale 
at all, Galasin´ski, 2008). The items gauge the severity of such symptoms 
as sadness, pessimism, sense of failure, self-dissatisfaction, guilt, punish-
ment, self-dislike, self-accusations, suicidal ideas (items 1–9; see also Beck 
et al., 1996) and others.
Theoretical assumptions
Methodologically, the article is anchored in the constructionist view 
of discourse underpinned by the assumptions of the critically oriented 
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discourse analysis. I assume that social reality is constructed through and 
within language and that every language use designed to represent reality 
necessarily entails decisions as to which aspects of that reality to include, 
and decisions as to how to arrange them. Each of these selections, both 
in content and the lexico-grammatical form, made in the construction of a 
message carries its share of these ingrained values, so that the reality re-
presented is ideologically constructed (Hodge and Kress, 1993: 5). It is 
also through discourse (i.e. practices of language use) that language users 
constitute social realities: their knowledge of social situations, the inter-
personal roles they play, their identities and relations with other interacting 
social groups (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). No text, spoken or written, 
including such ‘scientifi c’ instruments as questionnaires, presents reality in 
a neutral or objective way; representation is never of reality ‘as it really 
is’, rather it is always looking at it through the tinted lens of ideological 
assumptions (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1993; Halliday, 1994; Barker 
and Galasiñski, 2001).
In my analysis I focus on both the content and the form of the message, 
relating it to the larger socio-political context in which they are used. Also, 
each act of analysis carries with it a decision regarding which of the aspects of 
the message to focus upon as the most relevant in constructing the realities 
under consideration. Using both the systemic-linguistic analysis (Halliday, 
1994) as well as a hermeneutic-like interpretation of discourses in terms 
of the context in which they were submerged (see Titscher et al., 2000), 
I am attempting to reach the ideological underpinnings of the informants’ 
experiences.
I am not interested in discourses used in designing the questionnaire 
(see also Galasiñski, 2008). Rather, I am interested in discourses pro-
duced by informants as a result of dealing with an imposed version of 
reality. Thus, I want to approach the issue from the opposite end to what 
has been done so far. I want to take the perspective of the respondent and 
their experiences of having to deal with the institutionally empowered 
instrument designed to gauge their state of emotions and mind. To my 
knowledge there has been no research exploring the issue. Studies such 
as Houtkoop-Steenstra’s (2000; also Suchman and Jordan, 1990; Antaki 
et al., 1996; Antaki, 2001) analysis of interaction in survey interviews 
explore standardized instruments, which are designed for interaction be-
tween the researcher and the respondent. In contrast I am taking on board 
an instrument that has not been designed for such interaction.
The experience of the BDI
There were three kinds of responses to the BDI’s items. First, there were 
those where the informants accepted the item’s requirement and made their 
choices accordingly, minimally narrating what they were doing. Second, 
there were those where the informants did not offer any comment (in fact 
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there were a few interviews in which the informants offered barely any 
comment at all). Such responses must be taken only as indicating that the 
informant would not make comment, rather than that s/he found the item/s 
acceptable. These two types of response accounted for a small minority of 
all the responses.
Third, there were those which the informants found problematic, un-
acceptable. These were instances where the experience of the informant 
could not be framed by the BDI. In this article I am focusing solely on this 
kind of response. There were three strategies with which the informants 
coped with the BDI. When they chose to interact with it, they reformulated 
the instrument’s items in the way that suited them or, alternatively, they 
recontextualized the BDI and provided the context that allowed them to 
challenge the instrument’s categories. On the other hand, some informants 
chose to construct the instrument as one with which one cannot interact 
and rejected it altogether. This was a blanket contestation of the BDI as 
inappropriate for one reason or another.
In my analysis I was interested in the discursive ‘fi t’ between what the 
items demanded from the informant and what the informant actually de-
cided to do with such demand. Just as with any communicative action 
designed to elicit a response, the items of a diagnostic instrument demand 
a particular answer. They project a ‘demand’, the meeting of which makes 
the response relevant (on relevance and conversational demand see, for 
example, Dascal, 1977; Holdcroft, 1987). Thus, the BDI, as other instru-
ments, requires one not merely to make a choice from a selection pro-
vided, but also, implicitly, demands that the response is underpinned by the 
assumptions made in the question/item.
The three strategies I have identifi ed subsume all those answers of the 
informants in which this was not the case. In other words, there was a hiatus 
between what the items demanded from the respondent and what s/he did 
in her/his account of what s/he was doing.
However, rejecting the instrument’s relevancies is done at different 
levels in the three strategies. In the fi rst one, the informants choose to 
ignore the demand projected by the item; the strategy is identifi ed on the 
basis of a semantic relationship between the item and the response. It can 
be seen in terms of pretence (Galasiñski, 2000) in that while providing a 
semantically irrelevant response, the informants maintain the pretence of 
co-operative completion of the instrument. The other two strategies offer 
an explicit challenge to the instrument in that they problematize its items. 
In the second strategy, the respondents re-interpret the items in different 
contexts, pointing out that they cannot be seen outside a particular context, 
while the third strategy rejects the items completely. Importantly, despite 
these challenges, the informants chose to co-operate at the basic level of 
fi lling out the BDI (see also later).
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Reformulations
The fi rst strategy I am going to discuss is reformulations and consists of 
responses in which the informants answer a different question from the one 
posed by the BDI. The informants re-constructed the items and the ques-
tions became those which the informants wanted to answer, rather than 
those which the BDI asked.
However, by suggesting that what the informants did is strategic, I am im-
plicitly proposing that what they said was serving the goal of not engaging 
with the BDI as it was likely to be designed, and thus their strategy was 
deceptive or manipulative. Such an assumption is problematic. I have no 
evidence to suggest that this is the only explanation for what happened. 
It may well have been that the informants understood the items in a par-
ticular way and answered to the best of their understanding. Either way, 
however, the situation is quite unacceptable from the point of view of a 
quantitative instrument. Consider the following.2
Extract 1
AB, female, young, ‘uneducated’, town
(on item 12, Social Withdrawal)
Perhaps answer two, I have lost most interest in other people, now everything 
focuses round home, my nephew. He interests me the most, because he is tiny, 
lovely.
Item 12 in the BDI, gauging the level of social withdrawal was not meant to 
apply to people who lost interest in others because they had a new baby in 
the family. It was placed into the context of the informant’s experience and 
she chose to mark a high score on the social withdrawal item. The extract 
shows the extent to which there is a mismatch between the BDI and the 
way the informant reformulates an item. The application of the scale in 
the local context of the informant’s life reconstructs the way the item can 
be understood and thus interacted with. And the new baby is quite enough 
to overrule the relevancies of the BDI by the concerns of the day.
In the next two pairs of extracts I would like to show both how the in-
formants interacted with an item, as well as the differences between them. 
The following two extracts are both made in reaction to item 14, Body 
Image Change.3
Extract 2
BC, female, young, ‘uneducated’, town
Indeed, I do worry that I look old or unattractive. I always think whether I am 
well dressed or not. Is it hip or not? And I worry, like in the question, that I look 
old and unattractive and I am thinking whether I look good, whether I am hip or 




MU, female, old, ‘uneducated’, town
I worry whether I look old and unattractive. I have not got the means to take 
care of my looks ’cause everything costs money.
Not only did neither informant take the item as it was likely to be meant – 
thus as one gauging the level of satisfaction with one’s body – but they 
also differed in their understandings. MU takes the question in terms of 
her economic situation – she cannot afford to take care of herself; BC 
on the other hand interprets it in terms of her ‘fashion judgement’, both 
reformulating the question to refl ect their experiences. The two women 
supply their own relevancies and their own contexts in the interaction 
with the questionnaire, the relevancies most likely related to their age and, 
possibly, gender.
Interestingly, both informants take over the linguistic form of the option 
they choose: ‘I worry that I look old and unattractive’. They both ‘worry’ 
(martwic´ sie˛), still they subvert the item. The space offered by the BDI 
is rejected and the informants offer a reformulation thereof. Yet, despite 
the rejection, they both opted for option 1, which suggests that they might 
present some symptoms of depression, even though, in view of their com-
ments, their choices on the questionnaire are just about meaningless.
Similarly, it is primarily the context of age that underpins the following 
two responses to the item gauging Loss of Libido (item 21).
Extract 4
BC, female, young, ‘uneducated’, town
I am not particularly interested in the sexual problem for the time being. I don’t 
think about it, I have not got a boyfriend, so somehow I have not thought about 
it, so even though I am of certain age, I am not concerned, I am not interested. 
Somehow, I have not thought about it, even though my [girl] friends do have 
boyfriends.
Extract 5
PK, male, old, ‘educated’, city
I am less interested in the issues of gender and sex and so on, and it results from, 
well, the age, and, obviously, that at present there is the unfavourable situation 
for men, 50 per cent, as they say on TV, have problems with the prostate, so this 
kind of thing happened to me.
While BC understands the questions aimed at probing into loss of libido as 
those about her interest in forming relationships (she still chooses option 
2: ‘Sexual problems are distinctly of less interest to me’!), PK understands 
it in terms of his ability to engage in sexual activity. Both reformulate the 
intended meaning of the item to refl ect their own concerns.
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It is perhaps worth noting that the instrument assumes that people have a 
‘healthy’ appetite for sex. Within the world of the BDI, one cannot answer 
the question of whether one is interested in sex with ‘well, it depends with 
whom’. It does not feature all sorts of reasons why people might be less 
interested in sex: illness, religion and other convictions, arduous lifestyle, 
or simply might not want it at all!
Recontextualizations
The informants also recontextualized the BDI items. They explicitly pro-
vided a context for items that were problematic for them. So, while in 
reformulations the informants took the item to mean something different 
from what was intended, here, they understood it in the intended way, yet, 
they showed its limitations. This is a strategy in which the BDI was con-
structed as a-contextual, an instrument in its own world with little contact 
with the ‘real’ one. Witness the following extracts.
Extract 6
DW, female, old, educated, city
(responding to item 7, Self-Dislike)
One is never fully happy with oneself. One always thinks one could be better, 
could do better, could be prettier, be healthier, could be something, I don’t 
know, I am not particularly interested in wealth.
Extract 7
BO, male, young, ‘uneducated’, town
(responding to item 6, Punishment)
Looking from the point of view of the faith, every man deserves punishment. 
No one is sin free and everybody commits sins. And everybody deserves the 
punishment to a degree. And it depends on what kind of sins we commit, that 
kind of punishment we shall have, right? I think I deserve punishment. I think I 
deserve punishment.
Both informants chose to see the items in broad philosophical and religious 
contexts, invalidating thereby their points. If you cannot ever be happy 
with yourself, there is little point in asking whether you are; if you always 
deserve punishment, there is little point in asking whether you do. By recon-
textualizing the items, the informants not only invalidate them, but, more 
generally, they undermine the very basis upon which a questionnaire such 
as the BDI is founded: the possibility of asking a question of immensely 
complex experiences, which will be understood in a uniform way by people 
regardless of who they are, what outlook on life they have, what kind of 
experiences they have had. While reformulations cast doubt upon such a 
possibility implicitly, recontextualizations undermine the scale explicitly.
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The two strategies of interacting with the scale are a lived translation of 
the academic arguments against standardized probes into people’s experi-
ences (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1994; Speer, 2002). Implicitly, therefore, a 
recontextualization is also a contestation of the scale, a rejection of the in-
trument and its assumptions. But the informants also contested the scale 
explicitly.
Challenging the BDI
There are two ways in which the informants contested the BDI. First, they 
explicitly challenged the items as problematic, unanswerable. Second, they 
rejected the scale altogether. Witness fi rst the following two extracts in 
which the informants challenge the Sense of Failure (item 3) and Pessimism 
(item 2) items, respectively.
Extract 8
MM, female, young, educated, city
I don’t think I fail more than, but this is a little strange question, because it should 
refer to a situation, I think, right? I don’t know, a specifi c situation. And not just 
yesterday but a longer period …
Extract 9
JG, 70 years old, male, educated, large city
… the second question, I don’t care what it means, here is an interesting ques-
tion. Is it my future? Or the future of the family, people or what? I do worry 
about the future of the children, family. As regards myself, for me, I don’t 
care about the future.
The informants explicitly challenge the items for being unclear, impos-
sible to answer. But in the context of a medical or psychological interview, 
they would not have had the luxury of voicing their problems, there is a 
sheet to mark, and whatever their misgivings about the answerability of the 
items, each item must be scored – and yet, it is diffi cult to see the meaning 
of the score in the situation when the respondent thinks s/he cannot answer 
the question.
But the challenge launched by the informants went further. In the 
next extract, the informant explicitly rejects the validity of asking certain 
questions. Witness:
Extract 10
PP, male, old, educated, city
(responding to item 14, Body Image Change)
You can’t make one feel so down. I mean, damn it, everyone has been born, even 
the one most fucked up, a man, twisted, broken, head between his legs, but even 
he wants to live and he himself values himself. You can see it often.
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What is most interesting in the rejection by PP is that he positions the item 
as a potential trigger for low mood. The BDI is constructed not so much as 
asking about things, but, rather, as suggesting them. This crippled, twisted 
person in PP’s utterance has a right not to be reminded about his or her 
disfi gurement, his or her dissatisfaction. This rejection, made on the basis 
of humanity and rules of social conduct, is particularly forceful because of 
the initial nie moz˙na (‘one must not’), a phrase referring to a general, a-
contextual rule. One just does not do this kind of thing, the informant can 
be interpreted to say.
The last extract and others unquoted here raise all sorts of methodo-
logical, clinical and ethical issues. The BDI (and like instruments) must be 
seen as imposing the clinician’s frame of reference upon the experience of 
the patient with an almost complete disregard to that particular experience. 
The patient is asked to answer the questions constructed by the psych-
iatrist, posed by the psychiatrist and of interest to the psychiatrist. There is 
no possibility of negotiating the ‘illness narrative’ (Kleinman, 1988b; Frank, 
1995), one which is far from set once and for all, but, rather, social, context-
driven and rhetorical (Radley and Billig, 1996).
Finally, the extracts in this and previous sections show that the patient’s 
(or respondent’s) interaction is riddled with relations of power. Medical 
questionnaires are invested with much institutional, and particularly, 
medical power; they are not to be questioned, but to be fi lled in without 
the possibility of negotiation or rejection. The research reported here en-
couraged negotiation and commentary on what the informants were doing, 
and reformulations, recontextualizations and challenges were frequent. 
But, importantly, regardless of the strategy of interacting with the scale, 
the informants still made marks on the article upon which the question-
naire was printed! In the last two extracts, this power of the instrument was 
highlighted explicitly. One informant objected to the liberties taken by the 
item; the other resisted by ticking a different option from the one she might 
have wanted to select. But the ultimate challenge to the questionnaire’s 
power, however, was actually changing it, crossing out words that offered a 
position impossible to take, an action actually taken by a few informants. 
There is little doubt that such actions would not have taken place in ‘real life’, 
in front of a psychiatrist; or perhaps especially in front of a psychiatrist.
Discussion
In this article I set out to show how people interact with the Beck Depression 
Inventory. I have discussed three strategies in which people coped 
with problematic items. They reformulated them – answering different 
questions from those posed by the instrument. They recontextualized them 
– providing such contexts in which the items were rendered nonsensical. 
Finally, they contested the scale, rejecting it altogether. I have argued 
that the study showed lived evidence for a sizeable literature arguing 
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against standardized psychological and psychiatric instruments as silencing 
people’s voices expressing their experiences.
Now, my initial expectation was that it would be only the better edu-
cated social scientists who would reject at least some of the BDI’s items, 
while the rest of the informants would be largely co-operative in com-
pleting the instrument, either fi nding it too face-threatening to challenge 
the questionnaire or simply playing the game and expediting the process. 
I was wrong in these expectations. I have found no patterns in how the in-
formants interacted with the questionnaire, regardless of the level of their 
education, age and domicile. The three strategies were used by three groups 
without signifi cant change in the level of rejection of the instrument or the 
kinds of strategies that were employed. In other words, all the informants 
rejected the items, or the assumptions that did not allow them to complete 
the questionnaire in a way that they considered accurately rendering their 
experience.
But I can see at least three signifi cant reservations that can be made 
against my argument. First, my research was carried out with self-reportedly 
healthy people outside of the medical context, whereas the BDI is an instru-
ment explicitly designed to gauge the severity of an already diagnosed de-
pression and to be administered by a clinician. Second, the BDI is only 
one of a plethora of psychiatric instruments and cannot be seen outside 
the context of the patient’s full examination. Third, whatever the problems, 
it actually works; people who get better while undergoing therapy score 
better on the BDI. Moreover, it correlates with other measures and thus 
can be shown independently that it works. Incidentally, such reservations 
have been raised in my discussions with practising psychiatrists and 
psychologists.
Of course, I am not claiming to be able to deal with all the issues resulting 
from the problems I am going to discuss; they go right to the heart of psy-
chopathological research and diagnosis by standardized instruments. Thus 
I am attempting to show the possible reservations as problematic and 
unobvious and propose my comments as a platform from which further 
research and critical refl ection is needed.
BDI and interaction with healthy people
What is crucial here is that the BDI assumes a nil score. The problem is that 
even the nil score is still taken to indicate depression (Beck et al., 1996) 
– most likely because the primary goal of the BDI is to gauge the severity 
of depression in those already diagnosed. The consequences of such a 
stipulation are quite profound. For if the nil score still means depression, 
then either the scale does not gauge the severity of the symptoms, or it 
is a scale whose (at least ancillary) aim is that of confi rming and thus co-
constructing depression, regardless of the merits of the diagnosis, a position 
untenable in view of a relatively large body of literature on the problems 
faced by psychiatric diagnosis, including Beck’s own classical studies 
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(Beck, 1962; Beck et al., 1962, see also Kleinman, 1988a; Caplan and 
Cosgrove, 2004; Sadler, 2005).
Yet, in view of the scale itself, the nil score must actually mean ‘no 
depression’, as it is constructed in terms of denying symptoms (in itself 
extremely problematic, Galasiñski, 2008) and it is taken to mean this in 
quite a number of studies in which it is used in detecting possible depres-
sion in non-clinical populations (Lasa et al., 2000; Dutton et al., 2004). Quite 
obviously such research assumes the possibility of getting non-depressed 
people to complete the scale and it would be implausible to assume that 
everybody whose score is nil is depressed. There is no reason why the non-
clinical scale examined in this research should be seen as signifi cantly 
different.
Second, the reservation implicitly assumes that the BDI works only in 
medical or quasi-medical (clinical psychological) contexts. If its respond-
ents must necessarily be ill, then the BDI is actually an instrument of co-
constructing the sick role, reinforcing it and providing a hurdle for the 
patients in depression to clear in their attempts to shed it. Moreover, it 
assumes that there is a ‘right’ way of completing the questionnaire and it 
depends on the patient’s sharing the discourse of psychiatry, or at least the 
discourse of the testing session and understanding what exactly is meant by 
the questions, and what kind of answers are expected of them. This, in turn, 
relies on medicalization of the patient’s experience of ‘professionalization’ 
of patienthhood. Indeed, the responses of the informants suggest that they 
are not familiar with the notion of a depression scale, and they reject the 
idea that it is possible to square their experiences into a frame provided 
by the BDI.
The BDI in the context of the entirety of the patient’s experience
The second reservation might be that the doctor or therapist should see the 
BDI score in the larger context of the information on the patient. Admit-
tedly, also such a score cannot be seen outside the larger context of the 
entire doctor–patient interaction and other diagnostic tools at the disposal 
of the clinician.
Now, as much as discourse is context-dependent (how what is said is 
meant or understood depends on the context), it is also context-renewing 
(i.e. what is said infl uences the context). Test scores are not only to be 
viewed within the context of the clinician’s story of the patient, they also 
co-construct the story. It is implausible to assume that clinicians who ad-
minister such tests as the BDI, do it only to reject them because of the 
‘wider context’. Indeed, it is equally implausible to assume that there is 
some true and complete knowledge of the patient that can be seen as the 
ultimate context in which to view such measures, one to which the scores 
of standardized measures do not contribute. The doctor’s knowledge of 
human experience (extremely complex and diffi cult to pin down, even 
for the most experienced clinicians, as acknowledged also by mainstream 
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psychiatry, see, for example, Zimmerman, 1994), is discursive, contextual 
and subject to change, probably at a moment’s notice, depending on, among 
others, test scores.
Moreover, the assumption that such contexts exist presumes a certain 
transparency of the patient. It assumes that the patient’s symptoms can be 
‘read off’, or as Verhaeghe (2004: 197) puts it, they can be ‘extracted’ from 
the patient, whose story is actually hindering the clinicians’ task. Not only 
is the knowledge of the patient ever-provisional (even if the institutions 
provide means to reify it, for example in the form of patient notes), but it is 
gathered through interaction which is as much imbued with power relations 
and ‘face’ concerns as any other social situation. Patients are not trans-
parent actors saying the truth, only the truth and nothing but the truth. Face 
concerns might be an overarching contextual consideration for the patient.
But it works!
Finally, one could argue that, social and discursive critiques notwith-
standing, the BDI and other such measures simply work and do offer insight 
into the patients’ condition and recovery. After all, people have different 
scores during and after therapy – indeed improving BDI scores are taken to 
be evidence of therapy’s effectiveness (e.g. Grant et al., 2004). So, the argu-
ment continues: people might not exactly know what the author meant; 
still, they are able to fi ll in the scale consistently and one is able to have 
insight into their depression.
There are a number of problems with such an argument. First and most 
important is that the argument relies on the patient’s ‘professionalism’. S/he 
knows what is involved and plays along so that the doctor can have the data 
they need. Once again it assumes operating in medical discourses. The cross-
instrument correlation often given in evidence would result not so much 
from the instruments’ ability to gauge experience, but, rather, from their 
roots in the same dominant psychiatric discourse in which the patient is also 
submerged. Knowing what might be at stake – especially in a psychiatrist’s 
surgery – the patient co-operates more or less willingly, trying to give 
the ‘right’ answers. Incidentally, such co-operation in not very diffi cult in 
the case of the BDI – it is extremely easy to realize after reading the fi rst 
couple of items that there is a pattern to how the scoring is made and one 
can give answers without even reading the items (Dahlstrom et al., 1990).
The model of quantifying the experience of mental illness necessarily 
results in the dominance of medical discourse. The patient’s experience 
cannot surface as s/he plays the game, getting more ‘professional’ every 
time s/he is asked to complete a questionnaire. Regardless of the theor-
etical standpoint assuming either that experience is primarily discursive or 
that there is a depression to be discovered behind the words, the situation 
is hardly acceptable. By having to respond to instrument items, the patient 
cannot access their depression. As Edgar (2005) points out, diagnostic 
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instruments impose themselves and their institutionally sanctioned goals 
upon the patient, inhibiting, at the same time, the possibility of the patient’s 
refl ecting upon her/his illness and its meaning. The situation of completing 
a questionnaire is one in which the patient cannot fi nd their voice and offer 
a story of suffering rather than a measurement of madness (Kangas, 2001). 
Finally, it is one in which the potential diagnosis is institutionalized and 
becomes non-negotiable and thus adds to the trauma of being a psychiatric 
patient (Sayre, 2000; also Phillips, 2003).
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that psychological and psych-
iatric testing does not account for the power relations involved in the 
activity. It is crucial to understand that completing the BDI, and indeed 
other such instruments, is a socially situated, context-dependent activity, 
with its particular confi guration of power relations, particularly relevant in 
the context of a psychiatric examination. Patients are not empowered to 
challenge the test itself, as the informants in my study were – they are to get 
on with the task; the co-operation is more than likely to be obtained.
The BDI cannot be seen outside its anchorage in the dominant discourse 
of psychiatry and clinical psychology. It works within the parameters of such 
discourse, and so it successfully measures something, because it corresponds 
with the rules of what constitutes such measurement. And while it might 
identify the (Major) Depressive Episode (ICD F32–33 or DSM, 296.2–3), 
it is unlikely to pin down the experience of low mood, sadness, the experi-
ence of what we call ‘depression’.
The obvious fi nal question to be considered is the value of the BDI (or 
indeed any other standardized psychiatric instrument’s) score. Is it useful? 
As a linguist, I cannot see the point of it. As I have argued above, com-
pleting the questionnaire is part of a set of practices that turn people into 
patients and professionalize their patienthood. It does not offer a platform 
upon which a patient’s experience can be meaningfully translated offering 
a clinician a shortcut insight into the patient’s illness. In this sense, my point 
is not about coming up with a yet newer version of the BDI or any other such 
instrument. The practice of administering scales cannot be seen as having 
much to do with the experience of mental illness; rather, it is a means of 
getting the patient to submerge themselves into the dominant psychiatric 
discourse. The medical evaluation of this point is beyond the scope of an 
article by a linguist.
I would like to end this article with a plea for more concerted research 
leading to development of methods of assessment which would allow insight 
into experience of distress, ones which are framed by this experience and 
not put a frame on it which is only relevant to the researcher/clinician. It is 
important for such research to cross the boundaries of disciplines tradition-
ally dealing with mental illness and its assessment. I hope to have shown 
here that discourse analysis can play a role of a critical but useful friend 




1. The research adhered to the ethical guidelines for research issued by the 
Polish Psychological Association (PTP). It was approved and monitored in the 
Wroclaw Faculty of the Warsaw School of Social Psychology. 
2. For space and practical reasons, I have decided to show only the translations 
of the Polish original discourses. The originals can be obtained from me by 
request. All translations of the data are mine. Sometimes, the extracts may 
seem somewhat disjointed and presented in ‘poor’ English. This is because 
I have attempted to render the originals as closely as possible. 
3. This item was dropped from the BDI-II. I have decided to include the data 
resulting from the interaction with it, for my aim here is to show how people 
interact with a questionnaire. Moreover, my critique posits that quantitative 
instruments do not and cannot offer a meaningful insight into such complex 
and ideologically underpinned experiences such as that of mental illness. 
Amending the instrument (for example, by dropping an item) is not at issue.
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